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- | ====== 2013 Schedule====== | + | <html><a id="top"></a></html> |
- | The .pdf document hereunder is subject to modifications at all times.. | + | |
+ | ===== Program 2016 ===== | ||
+ | |||
+ | ---- | ||
+ | |||
+ | == Monday 20.06 == | ||
+ | * 09:30-10:15: //Coffee & Snacks// | ||
+ | * 10:15-11:15: <html><a href="#gligor">Defender's Dilemma</a> — Virgil Gligor</html> | ||
+ | * 11:15-12:15: <html><a href="#shmatikov">Machine Learning and Privacy: Friends or Foes?</a> — Vitaly Shmatikov <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:shmatikov.pdf">(slides)</a></html> | ||
+ | * 12:15-13:30: //Lunch// | ||
+ | * 13:30-14:30: <html><a href="#junod">Towards Developer-Proof Cryptography</a> — Pascal Junod <a href="http://crypto.junod.info/EPFL-SURI-2016_slides.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | * 14:30-15:30: <html><a href="#buchmann">Long-term Security</a> — Johannes Buchmann</html> | ||
+ | * 15:30-15:45: //Coffee & Snacks// | ||
+ | * 15:45-16:45: <html><a href="#gisin">How can Quantum Cryptography Contribute to Cyber Security</a> — Nicolas Gisin <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:gisin.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | * 16:45-17:45: <html><a href="#juels">Exploring the Future of Smart Contracts</a> — Ari Juels <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:juels.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | == Tuesday 21.06 == | ||
+ | * 09:30-10:15: //Coffee & Snacks// | ||
+ | * 10:15-11:15: <html><a href="#groth">Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs</a> — Jens Groth <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:groth.pdf">(slides)</a></html> | ||
+ | * 11:15-12:15: <html><a href="#capkun">Secure Positioning: From GPS to IoT</a> — Srdjan Capkun</html> | ||
+ | * 12:15-13:30: //Lunch// | ||
+ | * 13:30-14:30: <html><a href="#kiayias">Foundations of Blockchain Protocols</a> — Aggelos Kiayias</html> | ||
+ | * 14:30-15:30: <html><a href="#lipmaa">Cryptographically Secure Mix-Nets</a> — Helger Lipmaa</html> | ||
+ | * 15:30-15:45: //Coffee & Snacks// | ||
+ | * 15:45-16:45: <html><a href="#sullivan">Forward Secrecy in TLS: A Systematic Study</a> — Nick Sullivan <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:sullivan.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | * 16:45-17:45: <html><a href="#camenisch">Cryptography for Privacy</a> — Jan Camenisch <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:camenisch.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | * Evening: //Social Event// | ||
+ | |||
+ | == Wednesday 22.06 == | ||
+ | * 09:30-10:15: //Coffee & Snacks// | ||
+ | * 10:15-11:15: <html><a href="#eriksson">Tracking Your Every Move: Today and Tomorrow</a> — Jakob Eriksson <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:eriksson.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | * 11:15-12:15: <html><a href="#aumasson">How to Compute with Secrets and not Die Trying</a> — Jean-Philippe Aumasson & Luis Merino </html> | ||
+ | * 12:15-13:30: //Lunch// | ||
+ | * 13:30-14:30: <html><a href="#kreibich">Haystack: A Multi-Purpose Mobile Vantage Point in User Space</a> — Christian Kreibich <a href="http://icir.org/christian/talks/2016-06-epfl-haystack/talk.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | * Afternoon: //Free// | ||
+ | |||
+ | == Thursday 23.06 == | ||
+ | * 09:30-10:15: //Coffee & Snacks// | ||
+ | * 10:15-11:15: Free | ||
+ | * 11:15-12:15: <html><a href="#cachin">Blockchain, Cryptography, and Consensus</a> — Christian Cachin</html> | ||
+ | * 12:15-13:30: //Lunch// | ||
+ | * 13:30-14:30: <html><a href="#vukolic">The Quest for Scalable Blockchain</a> — Marko Vukolic <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:vukolic.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | * 14:30-15:30: <html><a href="#polian">Hardware Trojans: An Emerging Threat for the Internet of Things</a> — Ilia Polian <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:polian.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | * 15:30-15:45: //Coffee & Snacks// | ||
+ | * 15:45-16:45: <html><a href="#kiyavash">Data Analytic in Anonymized Networks: Is There Hope for Privacy?</a> — Negar Kiyavash <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:kiyavash.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | * 16:45-17:45: <html><a href="#humbert">Privacy in Epigenetics: Temporal Linkability of MicroRNA Expression Profiles</a> — Mathias Humbert <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:humbert.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | == Friday 24.06 == | ||
+ | * 09:30-10:15: //Coffee & Snacks// | ||
+ | * 10:15-11:15: <html><a href="#chorti">Practical Examples of Physical Layer Security Schemes</a> — Arsenia Chorti <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:chorti.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | * 11:15-12:15: <html><a href="#troncoso">Traffic Analysis: When Encryption is not Enough to Protect Privacy</a> — Carmela Troncoso <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:troncoso.pdf">(slides)</a> </html> | ||
+ | * 12:15-13:30: //Lunch// | ||
+ | * //End of SuRI 2016// | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==== Talks ==== | ||
+ | |||
+ | ---- | ||
+ | |||
+ | == Monday 20.06 == | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="gligor"></a></html> | ||
+ | **10:15-11:15: Defender's Dilemma --- Virgil Gligor** <html><a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/jean-pierre.hubaux">(JPH)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | Advances in computing and communication technologies have posed persistent | ||
+ | dilemmas for security defenders over the past half a century, each seemingly | ||
+ | more daunting than the previous ones. For example, in the late 1960’s and | ||
+ | 1970’s, a dilemma arose in designing processor protection mechanisms, which | ||
+ | exhibited significant vulnerabilities in instruction-set architectures (ISAs). | ||
+ | That is, given the three key processor design objectives, namely performance, | ||
+ | object-code compatibility, and security of new ISAs, any two objectives are easy | ||
+ | to meet but meeting all three is very hard. This raised the dilemma of which | ||
+ | pair of objectives should one meet? Over the years, new hardware production | ||
+ | models relying on outsourced processor fabrication, system-board manufacturing, | ||
+ | and distribution posed a new dilemma. Should production be done in-house, where | ||
+ | one can retain control of security at a higher cost, or outsourced at a low | ||
+ | production cost but face the possibility of deliberate addition of malicious | ||
+ | hardware? The past decade also posed a basic dilemma for commodity software | ||
+ | markets. Rapid innovation in commodity software, which has been fueled by | ||
+ | zero-cost of market entry, zero liability for insecure systems, and zero | ||
+ | regulation, has led to low-cost, no-assurance components. This raises the | ||
+ | question of whether there ever be a market case for high-assurance secure | ||
+ | products, given that these will undoubtedly have higher cost? | ||
+ | Security-unfavorable answers to these above questions suggest a general | ||
+ | defender’ s dilemma: given that cyber-security is a fundamental problem of | ||
+ | secondary importance in the Internet, how can a defender ever win against an | ||
+ | attacker? (A similar dilemma seems to be posed by privacy, despite regulatory | ||
+ | initiatives taking shape in both Europe and the US.) In this presentation, I | ||
+ | will give a new example of a defender’s dilemma in the current Internet and | ||
+ | suggest an approach where the defender can win. Specifically, I will show that | ||
+ | non-traditional, large-scale link- flooding attacks, which can cause massive | ||
+ | denial of service as recently experienced by Protonmail in Switzerland, are | ||
+ | enabled minimum-cost routing -- a fundamentally desirable feature of Internet. | ||
+ | Although minimum cost routing does not degrade end-point host connectivity | ||
+ | during ordinary Internet use, it causes routing bottlenecks that can be | ||
+ | exploited by an adversary to degrade connectivity substantially. The defender’s | ||
+ | dilemma arises because these bottlenecks cannot be removed for the purpose of | ||
+ | countering link- flooding attacks since that would also remove a key routing | ||
+ | feature that reduces communication cost. The approach one can take is to deter | ||
+ | an adversary from exploiting a feature that cannot be removed despite the fact | ||
+ | that is causes an exploitable vulnerability. Although current law does not offer | ||
+ | effective deterrence against large-scale link-flooding attacks due to lack | ||
+ | uniform marginal enforcement, technical deterrence appears to work. That is, it | ||
+ | forces an untenable tradeoff for a cost-sensitive adversary: either the | ||
+ | adversary must pay an unaffordable price for the attack or be detected using | ||
+ | low-cost countermeasures. This approach requires higher-cost collaborative | ||
+ | defenses among ISPs to counter less frequent link-flooding attacks by | ||
+ | cost-insensitive adversaries. | ||
+ | |||
+ | //Bio:// Virgil D. Gligor received his B.Sc., M.Sc., and Ph.D. degrees from the | ||
+ | University of California at Berkeley. He taught at the University of Maryland | ||
+ | between 1976 and 2007, and is currently a Professor of ECE at Carnegie Mellon | ||
+ | University. Between 2007 and 2015 he was the co-Director of CyLab. Over the past | ||
+ | forty years, his research interests ranged from access control mechanisms, | ||
+ | penetration analysis, and denial-of- service protection, to cryptographic | ||
+ | protocols and applied cryptography. Gligor was an editorial board member of | ||
+ | several ACM and IEEE journals and the Editor in Chief of the IEEE Transactions | ||
+ | on Dependable and Secure Computing. He received the 2006 National Information | ||
+ | Systems Security Award jointly given by NIST and NSA, the 2011 Outstanding | ||
+ | Innovation Award of the ACM SIG on Security Audit and Control, and the 2013 | ||
+ | Technical Achievement Award of the IEEE Computer Society. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="shmatikov"></a></html> | ||
+ | **11:15-12:15: Machine Learning and Privacy: Friends or Foes? --- Vitaly Shmatikov** <html> <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:shmatikov.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/bryan.ford">(BAF)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | Machine learning is eating the world. Modern machine learning methods, | ||
+ | especially deep learning based on artificial neural networks, rely on the | ||
+ | training data collected from millions of users to achieve unprecedented accuracy | ||
+ | and enable powerful AI-based services. | ||
+ | |||
+ | In this talk, I will discuss the complex relationship between machine learning | ||
+ | and digital privacy. This includes new threats, such as adversarial use of | ||
+ | machine learning to recover hidden user data, and new benefits, such as | ||
+ | privacy-preserving machine learning that protects the confidentiality of | ||
+ | training data while constructing accurate models. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="junod"></a></html> | ||
+ | **13:30-14:30: Towards Developer-Proof Cryptography --- Pascal Junod** <html> <a href="http://crypto.junod.info/EPFL-SURI-2016_slides.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/bryan.ford">(BAF)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | Forty years after the publication of Diffie and Hellman seminal paper, | ||
+ | cryptographic technologies have become ubiquitous and are used by millions of | ||
+ | people on a daily basis. However, the quality and security of most | ||
+ | cryptographic implementations are often horrifyingly bad. In this talk, we will | ||
+ | demonstrate that a vast majority of cryptographic APIs are designed in such a | ||
+ | way that they significantly increase the likelihood of misuse by software | ||
+ | developers. A list of requirements leading to better crypto APIs will also be | ||
+ | discussed. | ||
+ | |||
+ | //Bio:// Pascal holds a MSc in computer science from ETH Zurich and a PhD in | ||
+ | cryptography from EPF Lausanne. He is currently a professor of information | ||
+ | security at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland, | ||
+ | where he teaches industrial cryptography, software reverse engineering and | ||
+ | software protection. He is also a co-founder of the startup strong.codes, which | ||
+ | is active in the domain of software protection. Before that, he has been | ||
+ | employed as an applied cryptographer in the Pay-TV industry, designing and | ||
+ | analyzing secure broadcasting systems. | ||
+ | |||
+ | His current research interests are applied cryptography, automated software | ||
+ | reverse engineering as well as software protection. | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="buchmann"></a></html> | ||
+ | **14:30-15:30: Long-term Security --- Johannes Buchmann** <html><a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/jean-pierre.hubaux">(JPH)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | With increasing digitization, the amount of data that require long-term | ||
+ | protection increases rapidly. Examples are medical data, electronic land | ||
+ | registers, and classified information. However, much of the security technology | ||
+ | used today appears to be inappropriate for the task of long-term protection. | ||
+ | This is particularly true for cryptography. Keys chosen today will be too short | ||
+ | in the future or they may be leaked over time. New attacks may be discovered | ||
+ | that threaten cryptographic schemes which are now considered to be secure. In | ||
+ | this talk a new framework is presented that allows for long-term integrity and | ||
+ | confidentiality protection. It uses a combination of cryptographic techniques | ||
+ | with quantum key distribution. We discuss the concept and its security and | ||
+ | present a prototype implementation. This is joint work of researchers at TU | ||
+ | Darmstadt and NICT, Tokyo. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="gisin"></a></html> | ||
+ | **15:45-16:45: How can Quantum Cryptography Contribute to Cyber Security --- Nicolas Gisin** <html> <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:gisin.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/jean-pierre.hubaux">(JPH)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | Quantum physics is a natural source of entropy: randomness out of (almost) | ||
+ | nothing! Moreover, the same random event can manifest itself at several | ||
+ | locations. Hence quantum physics is a natural building block for cryptography, | ||
+ | i.e. it offers Quantum Key Distribution. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="juels"></a></html> | ||
+ | **16:45-17:45: Exploring the Future of Smart Contracts --- Ari Juels** <html> <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:juels.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/jean-pierre.hubaux">(JPH)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | Smart contracts are programs that execute autonomously atop a blockchain. | ||
+ | Ethereum, for example, is a well known smart contract system based on a | ||
+ | decentralized blockchain resembling Bitcoin’s. Smart contracts promise to give | ||
+ | rise to a broad range of applications in finance, insurance, and rights | ||
+ | management, but their success will require solutions to a number of technical | ||
+ | challenges. In this talk I’ll enumerate the most important of these challenges | ||
+ | and discuss exploration of solutions and applications in the Initiative for | ||
+ | CryptoCurrencies and Contracts (IC3). Among other topics, I’ll present the Town | ||
+ | Crier authenticated data feed system, recent work mapping existing elements of | ||
+ | contract law onto smart contracts, and applications ranging from flight | ||
+ | insurance to bug-bounty marketplaces. | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a href="#top">back to top</a><br><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | == Tuesday 21.06 == | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="groth"></a></html> | ||
+ | **10:15-11:15: Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs --- Jens Groth** <html> <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:groth.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/serge.vaudenay">(SV)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | Zero-knowledge proofs enable a prover to convince the verifier that a statement | ||
+ | is true without revealing anything else. Zero-knowledge proofs are useful to | ||
+ | guarantee a party is following a protocol honestly, yet at the same time | ||
+ | protecting the confidentiality of the party's private data. Applications include | ||
+ | voting, mix-nets, verifiable outsourced computation, ring and group signatures, | ||
+ | virtual currencies, and multi-party computation. In the first part of the talk | ||
+ | we will introduce zero-knowledge proofs and applications. In the second part we | ||
+ | will put the emphasis on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and present a new | ||
+ | construction from EUROCRYPT 2016 with very small proofs consisting of only 3 | ||
+ | group elements each. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="capkun"></a></html> | ||
+ | **11:15-12:15: Secure Positioning: From GPS to IoT --- Srdjan Capkun** <html><a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/jean-pierre.hubaux">(JPH)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | In this talk I will review security issues in today’s navigation and close-range | ||
+ | positioning systems. I will discuss why GNS systems like GPS are hard to fully | ||
+ | secure and will present novel solutions that can be used to improve the | ||
+ | robustness of GNS systems to attacks. I will then show how a different design of | ||
+ | a positioning system can enable secure positioning, but also that this requires | ||
+ | solving a set of relevant physical- and logical- layer challenges. Finally, I | ||
+ | will present a fully integrated IR UWB secure distance measurement (distance | ||
+ | bounding) system that solves these challenges and enables secure distance | ||
+ | measurement and secure positioning in IoT applications. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="kiayias"></a></html> | ||
+ | **13:30-14:30: Foundations of Blockchain Protocols --- Aggelos Kiayias** <html><a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/serge.vaudenay">(SV)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | The rise of bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies puts forth a wealth of | ||
+ | interesting problems in distributed systems and cryptography that relate to | ||
+ | building decentralized systems. In this talk, we discuss what is the exact | ||
+ | problem that the bitcoin protocol solves and then go on to investigate whether | ||
+ | and in what ways the protocol can be improved. The protocol itself will be | ||
+ | abstracted in a simple algorithmic form, termed as the bitcoin backbone, and | ||
+ | subsequently provable properties like chain quality, common prefix and chain | ||
+ | growth will be detailed. The concept of a robust transaction ledger will be | ||
+ | defined, as captured by two basic properties, persistence and liveness. | ||
+ | Alternatives to the main protocol such as GHOST will be overviewed as well as | ||
+ | the relation of the defined properties and protocols to the consensus problem. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="lipmaa"></a></html> | ||
+ | **14:30-15:30: Cryptographically Secure Mix-Nets --- Helger Lipmaa** <html><a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/serge.vaudenay">(SV)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | TBA. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="sullivan"></a></html> | ||
+ | **15:45-16:45: Forward Secrecy in TLS: A Systematic Study --- Nick Sullivan** <html><a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:sullivan.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/bryan.ford">(BAF)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) was a concept first introduced by Günther in 1990 | ||
+ | to describe a property of key exchange protocols like Diffie-Hellman: past key | ||
+ | exchanges are secure against future attackers. In Transport Layer Security | ||
+ | protocol (TLS), the ciphersuites for which certificate private key compromise | ||
+ | does not allow an attacker to retroactively decrypt previously recorded | ||
+ | connections are said to be PFS. However, a close examination of how keys are | ||
+ | managed in real-world TLS deployments show that PFS is not a strong enough | ||
+ | guarantee to ensure secrecy of past (or future) communications in all | ||
+ | scenarios. In this talk we describe a more specific set of security guarantees | ||
+ | afforded to TLS during both stateless and stateless session resumption in TLS | ||
+ | 1.2, and explore the improvements to forward security in the upcoming TLS 1.3. | ||
+ | |||
+ | //Bio:// Nick Sullivan is a leading cryptography and security technologist. At | ||
+ | CloudFlare, a top Internet performance and security company, Nick is | ||
+ | responsible for overseeing all cryptographic products and strategy. Prior to | ||
+ | joining CloudFlare, he was a digital rights management pioneer, helping build | ||
+ | and secure Apple’s multi-billion dollar iTunes store. He is the author of more | ||
+ | than a dozen computer security patents and holds an MSc in Cryptography. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="camenisch"></a></html> | ||
+ | **16:45-17:45: Cryptography for Privacy --- Jan Camenisch** <html> <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:camenisch.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/bryan.ford">(BAF)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | The amount of personal information that is collected, stored, and processed | ||
+ | continues to increase daily, making our lives ever easier. At the same time, it | ||
+ | becomes increasingly hard to protect personal information, putting ourselves at | ||
+ | risk. In this talk we discuss a number of cryptographic mechanisms that can | ||
+ | provide all the benefits of a digital world while strong cryptographic | ||
+ | protection. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a href="#top">back to top</a><br><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | == Wednesday 22.06 == | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="eriksson"></a></html> | ||
+ | **10:15-11:15: Tracking Your Every Move - Today and Tomorrow --- Jakob Eriksson** <html> <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:eriksson.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/bryan.ford">(BAF)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | Not too long ago, tracking the movements of individuals was an obscure activity | ||
+ | largely reserved for detective novels and the occasional creepy stalker. | ||
+ | Lately, however, massive-scale continuous location surveillance has quietly | ||
+ | become a fact of life, pursued by organizations as diverse as Google, Amazon, | ||
+ | the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Department of Transportation, not to | ||
+ | mention cyber-criminals, jealous spouses and helicopter parents. An equally | ||
+ | wide range of technologies is used for this virtual stakeout job, including | ||
+ | spyware on your laptop and mobile devices, roadside radio receivers (Wi-Fi, | ||
+ | Bluetooth and more), license plate reading devices, face-recognizing | ||
+ | surveillance cameras, RFID tags and readers, and more. | ||
+ | |||
+ | In this talk, we will review some of the more pervasive people-tracking methods | ||
+ | in use today, together with some of their more (or less) well-known uses. We'll | ||
+ | then put on a pair of decidedly rose-colored glasses, and try to see what good | ||
+ | our Orwellian future may bring, and what challenges lie ahead, beyond the | ||
+ | quaint notion of protecting your location privacy. | ||
+ | |||
+ | //Bio:// Jakob Eriksson is an Associate Professor of Computer Science at the | ||
+ | University of Illinois at Chicago. Prior to that, he did a two year stint at | ||
+ | MIT CSAIL as a postdoc, received his Ph.D. at UC Riverside, and his | ||
+ | undergraduate degree at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm, | ||
+ | Sweden. His research interests include mobile computing, operating systems, and | ||
+ | computer vision. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="aumasson"></a></html> | ||
+ | **11:15-12:15: How to Compute with Secrets and not Die Trying --- Jean-Philippe Aumasson & Luis Merino** <html><a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/bryan.ford">(BAF)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | In this presentation we give an introduction to a recent trusted computing | ||
+ | implementation, followed by our assessment of the cryptographic mechanisms | ||
+ | behind it. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="kreibich"></a></html> | ||
+ | **13:30-14:30: Haystack: A Multi-Purpose Mobile Vantage Point in User Space --- Christian Kreibich** <html> <a href="http://icir.org/christian/talks/2016-06-epfl-haystack/talk.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/katerina.argyraki">(KA)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | Despite our growing reliance on mobile phones for a wide range of daily tasks, | ||
+ | their operation remains largely opaque. In this talk I will introduce Haystack, | ||
+ | a platform that leverages the VPN API on mobile devices to create a mobile | ||
+ | measurement platform that operates exclusively on the device, providing full | ||
+ | access to the device’s network traffic and local context without requiring root | ||
+ | access. I will present the design of Haystack and its implementation in an | ||
+ | Android app available in the Google Play store. Using data collected from 450 | ||
+ | users of the app, I will exemplify Haystack’s ability to provide meaningful | ||
+ | insights about protocol usage, its ability to identify security and privacy | ||
+ | concerns of mobile apps, and to characterize mobile traffic performance. I will | ||
+ | conclude with an outlook on our plans for Haystack's future and potential | ||
+ | avenues for collaboration. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a href="#top">back to top</a><br><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | == Thursday 23.06 == | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="cachin"></a></html> | ||
+ | **11:15-12:15: Blockchain, Cryptography, and Consensus --- Christian Cachin** <html><a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/bryan.ford">(BAF)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | A blockchain is a public ledger for recording transactions, maintained by many | ||
+ | nodes without central authority through a distributed cryptographic protocol. | ||
+ | All nodes validate the information to be appended to the blockchain, and a | ||
+ | consensus protocol ensures that the nodes agree on a unique order in which | ||
+ | entries are appended. Distributed protocols tolerating faults and adversarial | ||
+ | attacks, coupled with cryptographic tools are needed for this. The recent | ||
+ | interest in blockchains has revived research on consensus protocols, ranging | ||
+ | from the proof-of-work method in Bitcoin's "mining" protocol to classical | ||
+ | Byzantine agreement. | ||
+ | |||
+ | IBM is actively involved the development of a blockchain for the enterprise. In | ||
+ | this context an industry-wide collaborative effort, the Hyperledger Project, | ||
+ | has been established in early 2016 to develop an open-source blockchain. Being | ||
+ | one of the key partners in Hyperledger, IBM has already contributed code for | ||
+ | running an enterprise blockchain fabric. | ||
+ | |||
+ | This talk will present an overview of blockchain concepts, the cryptographic | ||
+ | building blocks and consensus mechanisms, and discuss current efforts in the | ||
+ | Hyperledger Project. | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="vukolic"></a></html> | ||
+ | **13:30-14:30: The Quest for Scalable Blockchain --- Marko Vukolic** <html> <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:vukolic.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/rachid.guerraoui">(RG)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | Bitcoin cryptocurrency demonstrated the utility of global consensus across | ||
+ | thousands of nodes, changing the world of digital transactions forever. In the | ||
+ | early days of Bitcoin, the performance of its probabilistic proof-of-work (PoW) | ||
+ | based consensus fabric, also known as blockchain, was not a major issue. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The situation today is radically different and the poor performance scalability | ||
+ | of early PoW blockchains no longer makes sense. Specifically, the trend of | ||
+ | modern cryptocurrency platforms, such as Ethereum, is to support execution of | ||
+ | arbitrary distributed applications on blockchain fabric, needing much better | ||
+ | performance. This approach, however, makes cryptocurrency platforms step away | ||
+ | from their original purpose and enter the domain of the classical state-machine | ||
+ | replication, and in particular its Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) variants. | ||
+ | |||
+ | In this talk, we contrast PoW-based blockchains to those based on BFT | ||
+ | state-machine replication, focusing on their scalability limits. We also discuss | ||
+ | recent proposals to overcoming these scalability limits and outline key | ||
+ | outstanding open problems in the quest for the "ultimate" blockchain fabric(s). | ||
+ | We further reflect on our practical experiences in building the Hyperledger | ||
+ | open-source blockchain fabric. | ||
+ | |||
+ | //Bio:// Dr. Marko Vukolic is a Research Staff Member at IBM Research - Zurich. | ||
+ | Previously, he was a faculty at EURECOM and a visiting faculty at ETH Zurich. | ||
+ | He received his PhD in distributed systems from EPFL in 2008 and his | ||
+ | engineering degree in telecommunications from University of Belgrade in 2001. | ||
+ | Dr. Vukolic is currently a steering committee member of Eurosys, was a PC | ||
+ | co-chair of the SOFSEM 2011 conference, and a member of numerous program | ||
+ | committees of major conferences. His research was awarded Eurosys 2010 Best | ||
+ | Paper Award and the IBM Outstanding Technical Achievement Award. His research | ||
+ | interests lie in the broad area of distributed algorithms and systems, | ||
+ | including fault-tolerance, blockchain and distributed ledgers, cloud computing | ||
+ | security and distributed storage. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="polian"></a></html> | ||
+ | **14:30-15:30: Hardware Trojans: An Emerging Threat for the Internet of Things --- Ilia Polian** <html> <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:polian.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/bryan.ford">(BAF)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | Historically, IT security concentrated on attack scenarios targeting software | ||
+ | and communication networks, but more recently, the system hardware moved into | ||
+ | the focus of attackers. Hardware-related threats are relevant even for | ||
+ | extremely software-dominated systems, which still contain some amount of | ||
+ | hardware on which the software runs; compromising this hardware makes the | ||
+ | entire system vulnerable. Even worse, many software-centric security solutions | ||
+ | rely on a hardware-based root of trust which stores secret keys and provides | ||
+ | essential security functions; successful attacks on such root-of-trust blocks | ||
+ | renders the entire security concept ineffective. With the emergence of | ||
+ | paradigms like cyberphysical systems, internet of things, or Industrie 4.0 that | ||
+ | connect the physical world, IT systems and global connectivity, hardware blocks | ||
+ | are at risk to become the Achille’s heel of entire infrastructures. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The presentation will focus on one emerging attack scenario: Hardware Trojans. | ||
+ | These are malicious modification of system hardware with the purpose to gain | ||
+ | control over its functionality and, e.g., be able to deactivate the affected | ||
+ | block at the attacker’s will (“kill switch”), or establish a side-channel to | ||
+ | access confidential data processed by the device (“backdoor”). Hardware Trojans | ||
+ | may be planted by an external foundry who manufactures the integrated circuit, | ||
+ | by a rogue in-house designer, by an external provider of intellectual property | ||
+ | blocks integrated into the design, or even by an electronic design automation | ||
+ | tool. Even though hard evidence of their occurrence in actual systems is largely | ||
+ | lacking, hardware Trojans are receiving substantial attention by academia and by | ||
+ | governmental agencies. The presentation will discuss the feasibility of such | ||
+ | attacks, recapitulate early proof-of-concept demonstrations, and explain novel, | ||
+ | more sophisticated Trojans on all levels. It will also discuss the capability of | ||
+ | various kinds of countermeasures, from silicon measurements and runtime | ||
+ | monitoring to formal methods, to detect the presence of Trojans and/or prevent | ||
+ | the attacks when they happen. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="kiyavash"></a></html> | ||
+ | **15:45-16:45: Data Analytic in Anonymized Networks: Is There Hope for Privacy? --- Negar Kiyavash** <html> <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:kiyavash.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/jean-pierre.hubaux">(JPH)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | The proliferation of online social networks has helped in generating large | ||
+ | amounts of graph data which has immense value for data analytics. Network | ||
+ | operators, like Facebook, often share this data with researchers or third party | ||
+ | organizations, which helps both the entities generate revenues and improve | ||
+ | their services. As this data is shared with third party organizations, the | ||
+ | concern of user privacy becomes pertinent. Hence, it becomes essential to | ||
+ | balance utility and privacy while releasing such data. Advances in graph | ||
+ | matching and the resulting recent attacks on graph datasets paints a grim | ||
+ | picture. We discuss the feasibility of privacy preserving data analytics in | ||
+ | anonymized networks and provide an answer to the question “Does there exist a | ||
+ | regime where the network cannot be deanonymized, yet data analytics can be | ||
+ | performed?." | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | //Bio:// Negar Kiyavash is Willett Faculty Scholar and an Associate of Center for | ||
+ | Advance Study at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She is a joint | ||
+ | Associate Professor of Industrial and Enterprise Engineering and Electrical and | ||
+ | Computer Engineering. She is also affiliated with the Coordinated Science | ||
+ | Laboratory (CSL) and the Information Trust Institute. She received her Ph.D. | ||
+ | degree in electrical and computer engineering from the University of Illinois at | ||
+ | Urbana-Champaign in 2006. Her research interests are in design and analysis of | ||
+ | algorithms for network inference and security. She is a recipient of National | ||
+ | Science Foundation's CAREER and The Air Force Office of Scientific Research | ||
+ | Young Investigator awards, and the Illinois College of Engineering Dean's Award | ||
+ | for Excellence in Research. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="humbert"></a></html> | ||
+ | **16:45-17:45: Privacy in Epigenetics: Temporal Linkability of MicroRNA Expression Profiles --- Mathias Humbert** <html> <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:humbert.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/jean-pierre.hubaux">(JPH)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | The decreasing cost of molecular profiling tests, such as DNA sequencing, and | ||
+ | the consequent increasing availability of biological data are revolutionizing | ||
+ | medicine, but at the same time create novel privacy risks. The research | ||
+ | community has already proposed a plethora of methods for protecting genomic | ||
+ | data against these risks. However, the privacy risks stemming from epigenetics, | ||
+ | which bridges the gap between the genome and our health characteristics, have | ||
+ | been largely overlooked so far, even though epigenetic data is no less privacy | ||
+ | sensitive. In this talk, I will first provide some background on epigenetics, | ||
+ | notably how it relates to the human health ecosystem. I will then show how | ||
+ | personal miRNA expression data, despite their variability, can be successfully | ||
+ | tracked over time. I will also present two mechanisms for mitigating the | ||
+ | linkability threat: (i) hiding a subset of disease-irrelevant miRNA | ||
+ | expressions, and (ii) probabilistically sanitizing the miRNA expression | ||
+ | profiles. I will conclude by presenting open challenges related to miRNA | ||
+ | expression data and, more generally, epigenetic privacy. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a href="#top">back to top</a><br><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | == Friday 24.06 == | ||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="chorti"></a></html> | ||
+ | **10:15-11:15: Practical Examples of Physical Layer Security Schemes --- Arsenia Chorti** <html> <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:chorti.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/serge.vaudenay">(SV)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | The security and integrity of communication systems, and especially wireless | ||
+ | networks, is a matter of increasing importance, affecting government, industry, | ||
+ | commerce and the privacy and financial security of us all. In next generation | ||
+ | wireless systems (5G) the overhead and latency imposed by cryptography is | ||
+ | expected to increase, while at the same time requiring simpler and less | ||
+ | energy-intensive wireless nodes. On the other hand, it was shown by Shannon, | ||
+ | in 1949 (and further developed by Wyner in 1975), that unconditionally secure | ||
+ | communication is possible. Specifically Wyner showed that for the wiretap | ||
+ | channel, in which the eavesdropper (“Eve”) has a poorer channel than the | ||
+ | legitimate receiver (“Bob”), the sender (“Alice”) can transmit confidential | ||
+ | data to Bob irrespective of Eve’s computational power. This concept, known as | ||
+ | physical layer security (PLS), has attracted significant attention in recent | ||
+ | years. However the concept has until now very largely been information | ||
+ | theoretic, and work in the area has not adequately addressed practical issues | ||
+ | which could give users sufficient confidence to put the methods into operation. | ||
+ | In this talk we discuss two practical PLS schemes that could find use in future | ||
+ | generations of heterogeneous wireless networks (5G and beyond). In particular, | ||
+ | we will first discuss an explicit encoder construction with guaranteed secrecy | ||
+ | for wireless network coding schemes with untrusted relays. The proposed encoder | ||
+ | is built around simple M-QAM modulators and could find use in secure | ||
+ | device-to-device communications. Secondly, we will review a simple scheme for | ||
+ | the generation of symmetric keys of guaranteed entropy from shared randomness | ||
+ | and we will discuss the robustness of such schemes to denial of service attacks | ||
+ | in the form of jamming. | ||
+ | |||
+ | //Bio:// Dr Arsenia Chorti joined the School of Computer Science and Electronic | ||
+ | Engineering of the University of Essex in October 2013 as a Lecturer. She | ||
+ | obtained her PhD from Imperial College London and has served as a Senior | ||
+ | Lecturer at Middlesex University between 2008 and 2010. From 2010 to 2013 she | ||
+ | was as a Marie Curie International Outgoing Fellow (MC-IOF) at Princeton | ||
+ | University where she currently holds a Visiting Researcher status. Her research | ||
+ | interests include, among others, physical layer security, physical layer network | ||
+ | coding, signal processing for communications. She is a member of the IEEE and of | ||
+ | the IEEE ComSoc Signal Processing, Communications and Electronics Technical | ||
+ | Committee (SPCE TC). | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a id="troncoso"></a></html> | ||
+ | **11:15-12:15: Traffic Analysis - When Encryption is not Enough to Protect Privacy --- Carmela Troncoso** <html> <a href="https://suri.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=slides:2016:troncoso.pdf">(slides)</a> <a style="font-size:65%;" href="https://people.epfl.ch/jean-pierre.hubaux">(JPH)</a></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | Intuitively, privacy is associated to the confidentiality of content. Yet, the | ||
+ | meta data associated with this content it, e.g., the sender, the receiver, the | ||
+ | time and length of messages, in itself may reveal private information. Using | ||
+ | anonymous communication systems as running example, this talk will provide an | ||
+ | overview of traffic analysis approaches. We will show how these techniques can | ||
+ | be used to extract information from secure systems in which information is | ||
+ | encrypted. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><br></html> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | <html><a href="#top">back to top</a><br><br></html> | ||
- | {{:schedule:schedule_suri_2013.pdf|}} | ||
- | <memento memento='IC' filter='suri2013' /> |